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I. RESPONSE TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In response to Respondents' "facts" setting forth what occurred with respect to the 
appraisal process from 2006 through 2008, 1 the correspondence and documentation associated 
with what occurred during that time frame speaks for it~elf and is included in the Augmentation 
Record on appeal, attached to the Affidavit of Cynthia Yee-Wallace in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Relief from Judgment and the Affidavit of William Hodges in Support of Plaintiffs 
Motion for Relief from Judgment. 2 (Respondents' Brief at 6). Respondents summarize facts and 
1 Two central themes emerge from Respondents' "Statement of Facts:" (1) that it is Villa 
Highlands' fault that it is purportedly underinsured in this case; and (2) that Villa Highlands 
stalled the appraisal process. However, the record before the Court on appeal establishes Villa 
Highlands' response to these themes, Had Respondents followed the terms of the builder's risk 
policy in determining if Villa Highlands was underinsured, the parties may not have been 
engaged in litigation over the policy. Further, the record adequately sets forth precisely what 
occurred during the course of the appraisal process, including the actions of Western Community 
in continually inflating the appraisals used to determine underinsurance in this case in an effort 
to find that Villa Highlands was underinsured. Respondents' conduct allowed them to avoid 
paying Villa Highlands the full amount due to it under the terms of the policy. 
2 At the outset of Respondents' "Statement of the Facts," they object to VillaHighlands' 
Statement of Facts on the grounds that it "contains information irrelevant to this appeal, 
mischaracterizes the record, contains unsupported assertions that are contrary to the record, and 
obfuscates the proper chronology of events." (Respondents' Brief at 2). Respondents did not 
provide any specific citations or references which show that Villa Highlands has 
mischaracterized or obfuscated the record. (Id.) Instead, Respondents argue that, as an example, 
"the reasons as to why the Villa Highland building was inadequately insured by the Appellant is 
not an issue currently before the Court on appeal." (Id.) Respondents go on to discuss this very 
issue and imply that it is in fact Villa Highlands' fault that it was not adequately insured in this 
case and they allude to their reasons why they believe this to be true. (Id. at 3-6). In any event, 
the reasons as to how Respondents determined that Villa Highlands was underinsured under the 
builder's risk policy is particularly pertinent to this appeal. Additionally, how the insurance 
policy was procured and how the limit of insurance was determined are also relevant to the 
background of this case. 
Moreover, it is in fact Western Community that makes unsupported citations to the record. For 
example, Respondents describe how they calculated the loss in this case. The loss was 
calculated with a spreadsheet and used $7,160,000 as the estimated value of the building on the 
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present extensive argument in their "Statement of Facts" which does not necessarily reflect the 
actual record in this case. Thus, instead of rebutting every single inaccurate point raised by 
Respondents, Villa Highlands will highlight these inaccuracies in responding to Respondents' 
arguments below. 
II. REPLY 
A. The Record Clearly Demonstrates that Western Community was Put on Notice of 
Villa Highlands' Breach of Contract Claim. 
Western Community first argues that there was no breach of contract action against it 
because the parties entered into a Stipulation Re: Villa Highlands Appraisal ("Stipulation") on 
January 17, 200_8 and that the effect of such "was that there was no longer any dispute between 
' the parties as to whether Western Community had paid the claim according to the dictates of the 
Policy." (See Respondents' Brief at 20; see also COE 7, Ex. C). Western Community goes on to 
argue that this Stipulation confirmed that the $3,127,207 paid by Western Community "fully 
satisfied its burden under the Policy," and states that this is reflected in the Second Amended 
Complaint. (Respondents' Brief at 20). Respondents also state that Villa Highlands "voluntarily 
dismissed" its claim for beach of contract directly with Western Community. (Id) However, 
Respondents' arguments defy the record in this case and are neither persuasive nor responsive to 
the controlling authority governing .notice pleading in this State. 
Count Four of the Second Amended Complaint, which was filed after the parties entered 
into the Stipulation, sets forth a short and plain statement for breach of the insurance contract 
date of completion. (COE 11, Ex. A). Respondents state that this figure was "presented by Villa 
Highlands" and was the amount reflected in the lender's (First Horizon's) March 15, 2005 
appraisal. (See Respondents' Brief at 6). However, this figure is no where to be found in the 
First Horizon March 15, 2005 appraisal. (See COE 17, Ex. N). 
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showing that Villa Highlands is entitled to relief. See e.g. Seiniger Law Office, P.A. v. North 
Pacific Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 241, 246, 178 P.3d 606, 611 (2008) ( citation omitted) and see 
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). The only contract discussed in Count Four is the builder's risk policy at issue in 
this case.' (R. Vol. I, pp. 176-177). Paragraph XXVII of Court Four states that: 
Based upon Zimney's apparent authority, Western Community 
and/or Farm Bureau are bound by his representations concerning 
the subject policy and failing to tender the amount due arises to a 
breach of contract. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 177) ( emphasis added). Paragraph XXVIII goes on to state that "As a direct result 
of Western Community's and/or Farm Bureau's breach of contract, Villa Highlands has suffered 
substantial damages in excess of$10,000, which amount will be proven at trial." (Id.) (emphasis 
added). This language sets forth that Western Community breached the builder's risk policy and 
that it was liable, in damages, to Villa Highlands as a direct result of its breach. Additionally, the 
language in Count Six and the prayer for relief in the Second Amended Complaint clearly 
reveals that Villa Highlands was alleging that Respondents had not satisfied their obligations 
under the builder's risk policy. (R. Vol. I, pp. 178-179, 181-182). 
Moreover, Western Community's Answer to the Second Amended Complaint also 
. evidences that Respondents were on notice of Villa Highlands' breach of contract claim. (See R. 
Vol I, pp. 170-182). Again, a party's response to a complaint can be sufficient to demonstrate 
that said party has been put on notice of a plaintiff's claims. See Seiniger Law Office, P.A., 145 
Idaho at 247, 178 P.3d at 612 (citing Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416,427, 
95 P.3d 34, 45 (2004) and Zattiero v. Homedale Sch. Dist. Number 370, 137 Idaho 568, 572, 51 
P.3d 382, 386 (2002)). Conveniently, Respondents do not once discuss or mention their Answer 
to the Second Amended Complaint anywhere in their appellate brief. (See Respondents' Brief). 
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This is because the language in their Answer is telling and persuasively establishes that Western 
Community was on notice of a claim for breach of the builder's risk policy in this case; 
Respondents filed their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint on January 29, 2008, 
thirteen days after their counsel signed the Stipulation.3 (R. Vol. I, p.· 183 and COE 7, Ex. C). If 
Western Community truly believed that the Stipulation resolved the dispute regarding whether 
Western Community had properly paid Villa Highlands' claim and confirmed that Western 
Community had fully satisfied its burden under the policy, its Answer to the Second Amended 
Complaint does not reveal Jhis belief. In fact, Respondents' Answer to the Second Amended 
Complaint reveals the exact opposite. Respondents' Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Twelfth, 
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth affirmative defenses all discuss or relate to defenses against 
a written breach of contract claim. (See R. Vol. I, pp. 186-188). Further, Respondents' Answer 
to the Second Amended Complaint does not even mention the Stipulation, which could have 
been pied as a defense, but was not. Moreover, Respondents' summary judgment briefing (filed 
in March of 2008) outlines that there remained a dispute over the amount paid to Villa Highlands 
and that there was an amount currently being demanded by Villa Highlands under the policy. 
(COE 10 at 8). In short, the Stipulation did not resolve all of the issues between Villa Highlands 
and Western Community, including the breach of contract claim. 
Western Community next sets forth its interpretation of the Second Amended Complaint, 
arguing that Court Four is not aimed at a claim based on the builder's risk policy but instead 
3 And, again, the district court ruled that Paragraph 1 of the Stipulation was irrelevant for 
purposes of interpreting the builder's risk policy in this case. (Tr. April 9, 2008, p. 73, L. 7-15, 
pp. 81-83). Thus, to now imply that this Stipulation, as a whole, has some total binding effect in 
this case is an inappropriate argument on appeal, because the district court's ruling in this regard 
has not been challenged on appeal. 
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refers to the "alleged contract formed by Zimney's representations under Count One of the 
Second Amended Complaint and not the insurance policy itself." (Respondent's Brief at 21 ). 
This argument is simply not genuine. Count One for breach of contract was asserted against 
Dale Zimney whereby Villa Highlands alleged that Daie Zimney breached an oral contract to 
procure full and complete insurance coverage for Villa Highlands. (R. Vol. I, pp. 173-174 and 
COE 16 at 9sl3). Clearly, Western Community was aware that the contract at issue in Count 
Four was the builder's risk policy, and not the contract alleged in Count One. (See R. Vol. I, pp. 
185). 
Paragraphs VI through XII of the Second Amended Complaint set forth Count One for 
breach of contract against Dale Zimney. (R. Vol. I, pp. 173-174). In Western Community's 
Answer to the Second Amended Complaint, Respondents specifically stated that "the allegations 
contained in Paragraphs 6 through 21 are not directed to either Defendant Western Community 
or Farm Bureau, these answering Defendants are not required to answer such allegations and, on 
that basis, deny the same." (R. Vol. I, p. 185, ,r V). This language alone directly contradicts the 
position argued in Respondents' Brief in this matter and their crafted interpretation of the Second 
Amended Complaint. 
Western Community next argues that its summary judgment briefing reflected its 
understanding that Count Four did not address a direct breach of contract claim on the insurance 
policy, but was one for vicarious liability. (Respondents' Brief at 22). Although it is true that 
Western Community argued that it should not be held vicariously liable for a breach of contract 
claim, its argument was primarily focused on the position that Villa Highlands' claims were not 
properly for breach of contract, but for negligence against Dale Zimney. (See COE 10 at 15). 
However, when Villa Highlands responded to Respondents' motion for summary judgment, it 
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asserted that Respondents were liable for their own breaches of the builder's risk policy. (COE 
15 at 25). Respondents did not respond to Villa Highlands' assertion. (See COE 26). Further 
still, regardless of what Western Community may have argued _in its summary judgment brief, 
Respondents cannot ignore what was asserted in their Answer to the Second Amended 
Complaint, which clearly denotes that they were on notice of a claim for breach of the insurance 
contract in this case. 
Respondents also argue that "from the time Villa Highlands executed the Stipulation at 
issue until the time of Perkins Coie's involvement in this case, Villa Highlands never undertook 
any efforts to procure discovery regarding a direct breach of contract claim against Western 
Community or otherwise prepare such claim for trial." (Respondents' Brief at 24). Respondents 
fail to cite any basis for this statement and no such basis exists in the appellate record. 
Curiously, Respondents subsequently acknowledge that the contrary was, in fact, true. At page 
41 of their brief, Respondents reply to Villa Highlands' arguments regarding the district court's 
denial of Villa Highlands' motion to compel Western Community's underwriting file information 
via 30(b )( 6) depositions. Clearly, discovery related to underwriting file information is directed 
to how an insurance carrier analyzes and rates an insured's property, including valuation of the 
property at the time the policy was written. Respondents' suggestion that Villa Highlands did not 
pursue any discovery related to a breach of contract claim is patently false. Unfortunately, the 
district court prevented Villa Highlands from obtaining this information. 
The language of the Second Amended Complaint and Respondents' Answer to the 
Second Amended Complaint establish that Respondents were on notice of a claim for breach of 
the builder's risk policy in this case. The language in these pleadings also demonstrate that Villa 
Highlands did not somehow "voluntarily dismiss" or "abandon" its breach of contract claim. 
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(See Respondents' Brief at 20, 23, 24, 25). Respondents fail to cite any authority in support of 
their references that Villa Highlands dismissed or abandoned its breach of contract claim and do 
not even respond to or cite any authority addressing notice pleading in this State. Instead, 
Respondents present various arguments aimed at distracting the Court from the controlling 
authority in this case and the language of the relevant pleadings at issue. The district court erred 
in ruling that Court Four did not state a cause of action for breach of the insurance policy in this 
case and its decision should be reversed and remanded for a new trial on this issue. 
B. Count Six was not Moot, the District Court did not Fully Adjudicated Count Six, 
and the Issues Raised at Trial had no Impact on Villa Highlands' Ability to Fully 
Adjudicate this Claim. -
Respondents argue that Count Six of Villa Highlands' Second Amended Complaint for 
. declaratory judgment was rendered moot after the summary judgment motions were decided in 
this case. (Respondents' Brief at 26). Respondents go on to argue, essentially, that the district 
court made comments that Villa H_ighlands' declaratory judgment claim would be concluded 
once the appraisal process was completed and that this was somehow binding on Villa 
Highlands. (See Respondents' Brief at 27). Villa Highlands is unable to find support for any of 
the citations to the record noted on page 27 of Respondents' brief.4 However, in any event, even 
if the district court made casual comments about its understanding of the conclusion of Villa 
Highlands' declaratory judgment claim, it made numerous other comments that reflected that: (1) 
Villa Highlands' claim was not fully determined; (2) that Count Six would be tried to the Court 
and not the jury; and (3) that Count Six would be determined only after the appraisal process 
took place in this case. (See R. Vol. II, p. 282 at ,r 4; see Tr. April 16, 2008, p. 61, L. 13-25, p. 
4
. It appears that perhaps Respondents are working from a different set of Reporter's transcripts 
than Villa Highlands on appeal as the page numbers cited by Respondents do not match the page 
numbers for the respective transcripts that Villa Highlands is using on appeal. 
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62, L. 1-6; Tr. April 28, 2008, p. 238, L. 13-25, p. 239, L. 1-2; Tr. April 16, 2008, p. 61, L. 13-
251; R. Vol. II, p. 282, ,r 4). 
Again in this case, the district court entered an order stating that Count Six was "To be 
determined" after the appraisals were completed. (R. Vol. II, p. 282 at ,r 4). Thereafter, the 
parties and the district court discussed that Villa Highlands' declaratory judgment claim would be 
tried before the court, not the jury, and that this claim had not been fully adjudicated. (See Tr. 
April 16, 2008, p. 61, L. 13-25, p. 62, L. 1-6; Tr. April 28, 2008, p. 238, L. 13-25, p. 239, L. 1-2; 
R. Vol. II, p. 282, ,r 4). Villa Highlands believed that its. declaratory judgment claim would be 
further adjudicated before the district court after the jury trial concluded, and the record supports 
this understanding. 
Respondents next argue that Villa Highlands stipulated to the amount of damages at trial 
and asserted that it was not contesting the appraisal proc~ss at trial and thus, Villa Highlands 
agreed with the outcome of the appraisal process. However, Respondents' arguments are 
misleading. The stipulated amount of damages at trial had nothing to do with any number that 
came from the appraisal process. Rather, the damages at trial wete determined by the amount of 
Villa Highlands' loss, $3,967,157 (which was stipulated to per the terms of the Stipulation 
entered on January 17, 2008), minus the amount that Villa Highlands had been paid to date by 
Western Community,$ 3,127,207. (See Tr. May 5, 2008, p. 10, L. 9-25, p. 11, L. 1-15; see also 
COE 7, Ex.Band C, p. 2 ,r 2; and Aug. R. Order on Defendant Western Community's First 
Motion in Limine at 2-3, ,r 5). The appraisal clause language in the builder's risk policy 
contemplates that if there is a disagreement regarding either the value of the property or the 
· amount of the loss, a written demand may be made for an appraisal of the loss. (COE 6, Ex. A. 
at 4 of 7, ,r E.2.) (COE 6, Ex. A). Thus, two calculations are contemplated: the amount of the 
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loss and the value of the building. The calculation of the loss was conducted by Western 
Community and there was no dispute concerning that.figure. (See COE 7, Ex. C and COE 11, 
Ex. A). The value of the loss had nothing to do with the value of the building on the date of 
completion or the appraisal process in this case. The value of the building upon the date of 
completion, however, remained hotly contested and was attempted to be determined through the 
appraisal process. Thus, it is simply misleading and inaccurate to state that the damages sought 
at trial had anything to do with the value of the building upon the date of completion that 
emerged from the appraisal process. 
Moreover, Villa Highlands was prohibited from offering evidence, argument or inference 
~egarding the appraisal process at trial, other than referencing that it occurred. (Aug. R. Order on 
Defendant Western Community's First Motion in Limine at 2-3, ,r 3). The district court entered 
an order on the first day of trial that stated: 
... Plaintiff may not offer any reference or inference to Western 
Community's adjustment of the loss which tends to cast the manner 
in which Western Community did anything improper in the 
investigation or adjustment of the loss. Further, since the 
adjustment process is ongoing due to the parties' current 
participation in the appraisal process, Plaintiff may not offer 
evidence, argument, or inference regarding the appraisal process, 
other than it occurred. Plaintiff also may not offer evidence or 
infer that Western Community took an inconsistent position during 
the adjustment process, incorrectly determined the value of the 
building upon the date of completion by utilizing fair market value 
or otherwise delayed or improperly paid Plaintiff's claim. 
(Aug. R. Order on Defendant Western Community's First Motion in Limine at 3, ,r 3) (emphasis 
added). In light of the language of this Order, it is perplexing why Respondents continue to 
argue that the trial somehow dealt with the appraisal process, since Villa Highlands was 
prohibited from making any reference to the process, other than stating that "it occurred." The 
purpose of the appraisal process was not to determine Villa Highlands' damages at trial, but to 
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determine Western Community's liability under the policy, which Villa Highlands was precluded 
from pursuing in light of the district court's prior rulings in this case. Similarly, there was no 
need for Villa Highlands to challenge the appraisal process during the trial since: (1) the 
appraisal process was not at issue in the trial; and (2) Count Six was still pending and claim was 
to be determined by the district court, not the jury. 5 
Respondents also criticize Villa Highlands for stating that it was not contesting the 
appraisal process for purposes of the trial. (Respondents' Brief at 32). However, as set forth in 
the record, Villa Highlands did inform the district court that it reserved its right to contest the 
appraisal process on appeal. (Tr. May 5, 2008, p. 7, L. 7-12). This statement was made because 
the appraisal process was not at issue at trial and Count Six was still pending. In addition, given 
the district court's pre-trial rulings, Villa Highlands had already made its intentions known that 
regardless of the outcome of the trial, this case would be appealed and Villa Highlands ensured 
that no argument could be made that it in anyway waived its right to challenge the appraisal 
process at a later point in time. (See Tr. April 28, 2008, p. 193, L. 10-17). Further, Villa 
Highlands' statement in this regard did not bar its ability to pursue its declaratory judgment claim 
after the trial but before any appeal. 
Respondents finally assert a half-hearted argument that Villa Highlands is attempting to 
raise an issue on appeal that was "never raised before the trial court" with respect to the appraisal 
process and criticize Villa Highlands for not confronting the appraisal process prior to the close 
of trial. (Respondents' Brief at 31 and 33). These arguments are entirely unfounded. Villa 
5 Villa Highlands would also once again note that the Judgment dismissing Count Six was 
submitted to the district court just days following the jury trial in this case, was signed, over 
Villa Highlands' objection, nine days after the jury trial concluded in this case, and was filed 
fourteen days after the jury trial. (R. Vol II, pp. 288 and 296-298). Thus, any criticisms of Villa 
Highlands for failing to adjudicate Count Six within this two week period are not reasonable. 
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Highlands raised, briefed, and argued the district court's dismissal of Count Six and the merits of 
the appraisal process in its Motion for Relief from Judgment, to which Western Community 
responded. (See Aug. R.). Respondents cite no authority which stands for the proposition that 
only motions or claims raised before the close of trial can be raised on appeal. If this were the 
law in the State of Idaho, then no litigant could ever appeal an order on a motion for relief from 
judgment or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or any other post-trial order or ruling. 
1. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Count Six by Siguing the Judgment 
in Favor of Western Community and Erred in Denying Villa Highlands' 
Motion for Relief from Judgment. 
For purposes of brevity, Villa Highlands incorporates herein its arguments made on pages 
24 through 36 of Appellant's Opening Brief, which were in large part not responded to by 
Respondents. In summary, the district court had no discretion to dismiss Count Six when it 
signed the Judgment in favor of Respondents because no applicable motion, proceeding, or 
stipulation was before the court to dismiss this claim. (See I.R.C.P. 12, 41, 56). In addition, 
there were unique and compelling circumstances justifying Villa Highlands' Motion for Relief 
from Judgment and justiciable controversies remained with respect to Villa Highlands' claim for 
declaratory judgment that had not been fully adjudicated. See Harris v. Cassia County, 106 
Idaho 513,516,684 P.2d 988,991 (1984). For these reasons, the district court erred in 
dismissing Villa Highlands' claim for declaratory judgment in Count Six and the district court's 
decision should be reversed. 
Respondents also essentially argue that Villa Highlands is not entitled to challenge the 
appraisal process pursuant to the terms of the policy and further assert that because Villa 
Highlands did not attack the appraisal process prior to the close of trial, it was forever precluded 
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from challenging the appraisal process.6 (See e.g. Respondents' Brief at 34-35). However, 
Respondents cite to no authority that supports these arguments. The appraisal process was to be 
determined after the appraisals took place in this case, which occurred the night before trial, and 
the appraisal process was to be determined by the district court, not the jury. Count Six was still 
pending after the jury trial concluded and Villa Highlands should have been permitted to fully 
adjudicate its claim for declaratory judgment. 
Moreover, notwithstanding the use of the word "binding" in the appraisal clause of the 
builder's risk policy, courts in other jurisdictions have held that determinations.made pursuant to 
these types of clauses are still reviewable and can be set aside. See Central Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co., 466 N.W.2d 257,260 (Iowa 1991) and Wells v. American States 
Preferred Ins. Co., 919 S.W.2d 679,683 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) and Quinn v. New York Fire Ins. 
Co., 126 N.W.2d 211, 213-14 (Wis. 1964). For the reasons set forth in Appellant's Opening 
Brief, the district court should have set the "umpire's" determination .aside and should have 
granted Villa Highlands' Motion for Relief from Judgment. The district court's refusal to do so 
was in error and its decision should be reversed. 
C. The District Court Violated Rule ll(b)(3) and the Circumstances Surrounding 
Davison Copple's Withdrawal Warranted Vacating the Trial. 
Respondents argue that the district court properly exercised its discretion in denying Villa 
Highlands' motions to vacate the trial because, had they been granted, prejudice would have 
6 Respondents also argue, essentially, that Villa Highlands put all of its "apples" in one basket 
by asserting only a negligence claim against Dale Zimney at trial, lost at trial, and is now 
attempting to revise its litigation strategy through this appeal. (See Respondents' Brief at 36). 
This comment is misleadingly convenient. Villa Highlands was precluded by the district c01.~rt's 
pre-trial rulings from pursuing any direct claims against Respondents at trial, which was not 
Villa Highlands choice or "strategy." Had the district court not dismissed Count Four of the 
Second Amended Complaint, this claim would have been tried before the jury in this case. 
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resulted to Respondents.7 (Respondents' Brief at 39). Respondents also argue that Villa 
· Highlands was really aimed at "re-start[ing]" the litigation which should not have been 
permitted. (Id.) Respondents' arguments are once again non-responsive to the controlling 
authority on this issue. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (b )(3) states in relevant part: 
Rule 11 (b )(3). Leave to withdraw - Notice to client. 
If an attorney is granted leave to withdraw, the court shall enter an 
order permitting the attorney to withdraw and directing the 
attorney's client to appoint another attorney to appear, or to appear 
in person by filing a written notice with the court stating how the 
client will proceed without an attorney, within 20 days from the 
date of service or mailing of the order to the client. After the order 
is entered, the withdrawing attorney shall forthwith, with due 
diligence, serve copies of the same upon the client and all other 
parties to the action and shall file proof of service with the court. 
The withdrawing attorney may make such service upon the client 
by personal service or by certified mail to the last known address 
most likely to give notice to the client, which service shall be 
complete upon mailing. Upon the entry of an order granting leave 
to an attorney to withdraw from an action, no further proceedings 
can be had in that action which will affect the rights of the party of 
the withdrawing attorney for a period of 20 days after service or 
mailing of the order of withdrawal to the party. 
I.R.C.P. 1 l(b)(3). The motion for leave to withdraw as counsel was granted on March 12, 2008 
and Villa Highlands was given 20 days from March 13, 2008 to obtain new counsel. (R. Vol. II, 
pp. 224-225). Over the next 20 days, the district court did not toll the deadlines for Villa 
7 Respondents argue that this prejudice was expressed through the district court's comment on 
March 12, 2008 that if it reset the trial it would be in one year, which was not fair to defendants. 
(Respondents' Brief at 39 and Tr. March 12, 2008, p. 4, L. 7-12). However, notwithstanding that 
fact that an alternate judge could likely have heard the matter sooner, this is not the reason why 
the court denied Villa Highlands' motion to vacate the trial. As set forth by the district court on 
April 9, 2009, the court found that six weeks was an adequate time to prepare the case for trial 
and that the associate on the case from Perkins Coie had previously worked on this case. (Tr. 
April 9, 2008, p. 125, L. 14-20). However, again, as set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, the 
district court violated Rule 1 l(b)(3) and given the timing of Davison Copple's withdrawal at the 
state of proceedings that it withdrew, a vacation of the trial date in this matter was justified and 
should have been ordered. 
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Highlands' opposition to the Defendants' motions for summary judgment, but instead left the 
time ticking so that when Perkins Coie entered an appearance in the case on March 21, 2008, it 
had three business days to organize, digest, and analyze the entire case and thereafter draft 
opposition briefing and affidavits in response to the pending motions. (See COE 14). No 
proceedings were permitted to take place in the 20 days fo11owing the service of the order 
allowing the withdrawal, and when the district court failed to toll the summary judgment 
deadlines it failed to comply with the rules governing withdrawal. 
In addition, the circumstances surrounding the timing of Davison Copple's withdrawal 
also warranted the district court vacating the trial and extending the deadlines in this case and the 
district court's refusal to do so deprived Villa Highlands of a fundamentally fair trial. 8 See e.g. 
Lambert v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 780, 769 P.2d 1152 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989). 
From the time that Davison Copple moved to withdraw until the time that Perkins Coie entered 
its appearance on behalf of Villa Highlands, the deadline to disclose rebuttal lay witnesses 
passed, Mr. Zimney's expert witness opinions were overdue, the deadline to depose lay witnesses 
had passed, the deadline to supplement discovery was days away, two opposition briefs and 
opposition affidavits in response to summary judgment motions were due in three business days, 
and counsel for Villa Highlands did not have sufficient time to prepare this complex case for 
trial. (COE 14, 19). The district court's rulings should thus be reversed. 
D. Villa Highlands' Claim for Consequential Damages is not Moot. 
Respondents argue that the district court properly refused to allow Villa Highlands to 
present evidence on its consequential damage claim because such information had not been 
8 At the very least, counsel for Villa Highlands should have been more careful not to make any 
statements that could potentially prejudice Villa Highlands or its case in the eyes of the district 
court when the motion for withdrawal was heard. This caution did not appear to have been 
exercised. 
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timely disclosed. (Respondents' Brief at 40). Villa Highlands has explained the circumstances 
surrounding the disclosure of its consequential damages in Appellant's Opening Brief, and 
incorporates those arguments herein for purposes of brevity. (See Appellant's Opening Brief at 
40-42). Villa Highlands had moved for an extension to supplement its discovery in light of the 
timing of Davison Copple's withdrawal and its motion was not decided. Thereafter, Villa 
Highlands supplemented its discovery within the time frame that it has asked for an extension 
and the district court deemed the information untimely and the timing prejudicial to 
Respondents. When Villa Highlands brought the fact that Respondents had previously seen 
iterations of the very discovery that was supplemented thus causing no prejudice to Respondents, 
its argument was disregarded. The district court should have allowed Villa Highlands the 
opportunity to present evidence in support of its consequential damages at trial and its decision 
to the contrary was in error. The district court's decision should thus be reversed and remanded. 
Respondents also argue that Villa Highlands' claim for consequential damages is moot 
because the jury in this case decided that Villa Highlands was not entitled to any damages. 
(Respondents' Brief at 40). Villa Highlands' claim for consequential damages is not moot. For 
the reasons set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief, the district court should have allowed Villa 
Highlands the opportunity to present its evidence on consequential damages to the jury and erred 
when it dismissed Count Four of Villa Highlands' Second Amended Complaint. (See Appellant's 
Opening Brief). Accordingly, if this case is remanded, the Court should reverse the district 
court's decision and allow Villa Highlands to pursue its claim for consequential damages against 
Western Community. 
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E. Villa Highlands Should have been Entitled to Pursue Discovery against 
Respondents. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(l) states that "[p]arties may obtain discovery 
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the 
claim or defense of any other party .... " I.R.C.P. 26(b )(1 )( emphasis). The information sought 
need only be "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Id. 
Again in this case, the district court refused to allow Villa Highlands to obtain discovery 
from Respondents from two different sources. Villa Highlands moved to compel documents 
previously disclosed, but not provided, by Respondents and also moved to compel depositions 
that it recently scheduled prior to trial. (COE 33). The documents sought by Villa Highlands 
concerned, in part, the underwriting process with respect to the builder's risk policy at issue. 
(/d.). Villa Highlands also sought to depose the claims adjuster and attorney who handled 
aspects of Villa Highlands' claim and the 30(b)(6) representative of Western Community in order 
to obtain information related to Respondents' underwriting process and claims adjusting process. 
(COE 33). The district court refused to allow this discovery stating that the same was not 
"relevant." (Tr. April 16, 2008, pp. 64-95). 
Respondents argue that Villa Highlands had a "full opportunity to conduct this discovery" 
and failed to pursue it.9 (See Respondents' Brief at 42). Respondents' argument simply fails to 
substantively address the rules and case law governing discovery. 
The discovery sought by Villa Highlands was reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence in connection with the claims and defenses asserted in this 
9 It is again worth noting that the discovery deadline was not extended in this case, but the 
deadline to conduct depositions waS extended. (Tr. April 9, 2008, pp. 127-128). The discovery 
deadline fell within the time frame that Davison Copple withdrew from this case. (COE 14, 19). 
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case. The underwriting of the policy and the investigation and handling of Villa Highlands' 
insurance claim were reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence with 
respect to its negligence claims and its claim for declaratory judgment, which were still pending 
during the trial. Moreover, this information is discoverable as it relates to Count Four, which 
was improperly dismissed. The district court failed to apply the standard set forth in Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26(b )(I) and its refusal to allow this discovery was in error. The district 
court's decision denying this motion should thus be reversed and remanded. 
DATED: May 7, 2009. 
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